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Abstract
Transfer learning, in which a network is trained on one task and re-purposed on
another, is often used to produce neural network classifiers when data is scarce
or full-scale training is too costly. When the goal is to produce a model that is
not only accurate but also adversarially robust, data scarcity and computational
limitations become even more cumbersome.
We consider robust transfer learning, in which we transfer not only performance
but also robustness from a source model to a target domain. We start by observing
that robust networks contain robust feature extractors. By training classifiers on
top of these feature extractors, we produce new models that inherit the robustness
of their parent networks. We then consider the case of “fine tuning” a network by
re-training end-to-end in the target domain. When using lifelong learning strategies,
this process preserves the robustness of the source network while achieving high
accuracy. By using such strategies, it is possible to produce accurate and robust
models with little data, and without the cost of adversarial training.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks achieve human-like accuracy on a range of tasks when sufficient training
data and computing power is available. However, when large datasets are unavailable for training,
or pracitioners require a low-cost training strategy, transfer learning methods are often used. This
process starts with a source network (pre-trained on a task for which large datasets are available),
which is then re-purposed to act on the target problem, usually with minimal re-training on a small
dataset [Yosinski et al., 2014, Pan and Yang, 2009].
While transfer learning greatly accelerates the training pipeline and reduces data requirements in the
target domain, it does not address the important issue of model robustness. It is well-known that
naturally trained models often completely fail under adversarial inputs [Biggio et al., 2013, Szegedy
et al., 2013]. As a result, researchers and practitioners often resort to adversarial training, in which
adversarial examples are crafted on-the-fly during network training and injected into the training set.
This process greatly exacerbates the problems that transfer learning seeks to avoid. The high cost
of creating adversarial examples increases training time (often by an order of magnitude or more).
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Furthermore, robustness is known to suffer when training on a small dataset [Schmidt et al., 2018].
To make things worse, high-capacity models are often needed to achieve good robustness [Madry
et al., 2017, Kurakin et al., 2016, Shafahi et al., 2019a], but these models may over-fit badly on small
datasets.
Contributions
The purpose of this paper is to study the adversarial robustness of models produced by transfer
learning. We begin by observing that robust networks contain robust feature extractors, which are
resistant to adversarial perturbations in different domains. Such robust features can be used as a basis
for semi-supervised transfer learning, which only requires re-training the last layer of a network.
Then, we consider the case of transfer of learning by “fine-tuning.” In this case, the source network
is re-trained end-to-end using a small number of epochs on the target domain. Unfortunately, this
end-to-end process does not always retain the robustness of the source domain; the network “forgets”
the robust feature representations learned on the source task. To address this problem, we use recently
proposed lifelong learning methods that prevent the network from forgetting the robustness it once
learned. To demonstrate the power of robust transfer learning, we transfer a robust ImageNet source
model onto the CIFAR domain, achieving both high accuracy and robustness in the new domain
without adversarial training. Finally, we use visualization methods to explore properties of robust
feature extractors.
2 Background
Adversarial examples fall within the category of evasion attacks—test-time attacks in which a
perturbation is added to a natural image before inference. Adversarial attacks are most often crafted
using a differentiable loss function that measures the performance of a classifier on a chosen image.
In the case of norm-constrained attacks (which form the basis of most standard benchmark problems),
the adversary solves
max
δ
l(x+ δ, y, θ) s.t. ‖δ‖p ≤ , (1)
where θ are the (already trained and frozen) parameters of classifier c(x, θ)→ yˆ that maps an image
to a class, l is the proxy loss used for classification (often cross-entropy), δ is the image perturbation,
(x, y) is the natural image and its true class, and ||.||p is some `p-norm. By default we will use the
`∞-norm in this paper. The optimization problem in Eq. 1 aims to find a bounded perturbation that
maximizes the cross-entropy loss given the correct label. There are many variants of this process,
including DeepFool [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016], L-BFGS [Szegedy et al., 2013], and CW [Carlini
and Wagner, 2017].
Many researchers have studied methods for building a robust network. Athalye et al. [2018] concluded
that many defenses can be broken by a strong adversary. Adversarial training [Szegedy et al., 2013]
is one of the defenses that was not broken by Athalye et al. [2018]. To make adversarial training fast,
Goodfellow et al. [2015] proposed training on an FGSM attack that uses just one gradient step to
form attack images. Tramèr et al. [2017] show that adding a simple random step prior to the FGSM
step is enough to break FGSM adversarially trained models. This demonstrated that strong attacks
can break networks that are hardened against weak adversaries. Madry et al. [2017] showed that a
PGD attack (which is a BIM attack [Kurakin et al., 2016] with an initial random step) is a strong
enough attack to achieve promising adversarial training results. We will refer to this training method
as PGD adversarial training. PGD adversarial training currently achieves state-of-the-art robustness
on bounded attacks for MNIST [LeCun et al., 1998] and CIFAR-10 [Krizhevsky and Hinton, 2009]
classifiers.
Tsipras et al. [2018] show that adversarial training with strong PGD adversaries has many benefits in
addition to robustness. They also state that while adversarial training seems to improve generalization
in regimes where training data is limited, it may be at odds with generalization in regimes where data
is available. This trade-off was also recently studied by Zhang et al. [2019], Su et al. [2018], and
Shafahi et al. [2019b].
While the transferability of robustness has, to our knowledge, not been studied in depth, Hendrycks
et al. [2019] studied the case of adversarially training models that were pre-trained on different
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domains. Our work is fundamentally different in that we seek to transfer robustness from one domain
to the other without resorting to costly and data-hungry adversarial training. We train the target
model on natural examples only, which allows us to directly study how well robustness transfers.
Additionally, this allows us to have better generalization and achieve higher accuracy on validation
examples.
3 The robustness of deep features
In this section, we explore the robustness of different network layers, and demonstrate that robust
networks rely on robust deep features. To do so, we start from robust classifiers (c(θr)) for the
CIFAR-100 and CIFAR-10 datasets [Krizhevsky and Hinton, 2009], and update θ by training on
natural examples. In each experiment, we re-initialize the last k layers/blocks of the network, and
re-train just those layers. We start by re-initializing just the last layer, then the last two, and so on
until we re-initialize all the layers.
We use the state-of-the-art adversarially trained Wide-ResNet 32-10 [Zagoruyko and Komodakis,
2016] for CIFAR-10 from Madry et al. [2017] as our robust model for CIFAR-10. We also adversari-
ally train our own robust classifier for CIFAR-100 using the code from Madry et al. [2017]. We use
the same WRN 32-10 architecture for training the robust CIFAR-100 model. To keep things consis-
tent, we use the same hyper-parameters used for training the CIFAR-10 models for the CIFAR-100
models.2
The performance of the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 models on natural and adversarial examples are
summarized in table 1. Note that in all of our experiments, we use adversarial examples built using
PGD attacks for evaluating robustness. PGD attacks are known to be the strongest optimization
attacks for models that do not work by corrupting gradient information (the models considered here
are trained using processes that do not mask gradients). Note that gradient-free attacks such as SPSA
are weaker than PGD for attacking adversarially trained models [Uesato et al., 2018].
Table 1: Accuracy and robustness of natural and adversarially trained models on CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100
Dataset model validation accuracy accuracy against PGD-20
CIFAR-10 natural 95.01% 0.00%robust 87.25% 45.84%
CIFAR-100 natural 78.84% 0.00%robust 59.87% 22.76%
We break the WRN 32-10 model into 17 blocks which are depicted in Fig. 2. In each experiment,
we first re-initialize the k deepest blocks (blocks 1 through k) and then train the parameters of those
blocks on natural images3. We train for 20,000 iterations using Momentum SGD and a learning rate
of 0.001. We then incrementally unfreeze and train more blocks. For each experiment, we evaluate
the newly trained model’s accuracy on validation adversarial examples built with a 20-step PGD `∞
attack with  = 8.
Fig. 1 shows that robustness does not drop if only the deep layers of the networks are re-trained on
natural examples. In fact, there is a slight increase in robustness compared to the baseline PGD-
7 adversarially trained models when we just retrain the last batch-normalization block and fully
connected block. As we unfreeze and train more blocks, the network’s robustness suddenly drops.
This leads us to believe that a hardened network’s robustness is mainly due to a robust deep feature
representations; this is why robustness is preserved if we re-train on top of deep features.
2We adv. train the WRN 32-10 on CIFAR-100 using a 7-step `∞ PGD attack with step-size=2 and  = 8.
3In this experiment, we use standard data augmentation techniques.
3
l=1 l=2 l=3 l=4 l=5 l=6 l=7 l=8 l=9 l=10 l=11 l=12 l=13 l=14 l=15 l=16 l=17
Number of deep blocks retrained
0
10
20
30
40
P
G
D
-2
0
va
lid
at
io
n
ac
cu
ra
cy
(%
)
46.06 46.43
44.56
36.54
30.29
22.28
15.49
14.08
10.63
8.28
6.02
2.05
1.17
0.36 0.04 0.03 0.0
Madry PGD-7 trained
Robustness of CIFAR-10 by retraining last l blocks
(a) CIFAR-10 PGD-20 accuracy
l=1 l=2 l=3 l=4 l=5 l=6 l=7 l=8 l=9 l=10 l=11 l=12 l=13 l=14 l=15 l=16 l=17
Number of deep blocks retrained
0
5
10
15
20
25
P
G
D
-2
0
va
lid
at
io
n
ac
cu
ra
cy
(%
)
24.61 24.72
20.61
15.57
10.7
8.28
6.03
5.14
4.27
3.2
2.28
1.08
0.62
0.28 0.08 0.04 0.01
Madry PGD-7 trained
Robustness of CIFAR-100 by retraining last l blocks
(b) CIFAR-100 PGD-20 accuracy
Figure 1: Robustness is preserved when we retrain only the deepest block(s) of robust CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 models using natural examples. The vertical axis is the accuracy on PGD-20 generated
adversarial examples (i.e. robustness) after re-training deep layers. The robustness of the adversarially
trained models if all layers are frozen are shown with a dashed lines.
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Figure 2: Wide Resnet 32-10 and the blocks used for freezing/retraining
4 Transfer learning using robust models as a source
We identified feature extractors as a source of robustness in section 3. It is natural to investigate
whether robustness is preserved when transfer learning using robust feature extractors. We will study
two different approaches for transferring robustness across datasets: one in which only the last layer
is re-trained, and one with end-to-end re-training.
4.1 Transfer learning 101: Recyling feature extractors
We study how robustness transfers when the feature extractor layers of the source network are frozen,
and we retrain only the last fully connected layer (i.e. the classification layer) for the new task.
Formally, the transfer learning objective is:
min
w
l(z(x, θ∗), y, w) (2)
where z is the deep feature extractor function with pre-trained and now “frozen” parameters θ∗, and w
represents the trainable parameters of the last fully connected layer. We can use different pre-trained
models as the source model for our transfer learning experiments. To investigate how well robustness
transfers, we use two source models: one that is hardened by adversarial training and another that is
naturally trained.
We use models trained on CIFAR-100 as source models and perform transfer learning from CIFAR-
100 to CIFAR-10. The results are summarized in table 2. Compared to adversarial/natural training the
target model, transferring from a source model seems to result in a drop in natural accuracy (compare
first row of table 1 to the first row of table 2). This difference is wider when the source and target
data distributions are dissimilar [Yosinski et al., 2014].
4
To evaluate our method on two datasets with more similar distributions, we randomly partition
CIFAR-100 into two disjoint subsets where each subset contains images corresponding to 50 classes.
Table 2 shows the accuracy of transferring from one of the disjoint sets to the other (second row) and
to the same set (third row). We can compare results of transfer learning with adversarial training on
CIFAR-100 by averaging the results in the second and third rows of table 2 to get the accuracy across
all 100 classes of CIFAR-100.4 By doing so, we see that the accuracy of the transferred classifier
matches that of the adversarially trained one, even though no adversarial training took place in the
target domain.
Table 2: Transfer learning by freezing the feature extractor layers.
Source Dataset Target Dataset Source Model val. PGD-20
CIFAR-100 CIFAR-10 natural 83.05% 0.00%robust 72.05% 17.70%
CIFAR-100
(50% of classes)
CIFAR-100
(other 50% of classes)
natural 71.44% 0.00%
robust 58.48% 15.86%
CIFAR-100
(50% of classes)
CIFAR-100
(same 50% of classes)
natural 80.20% 0.00%
robust 64.96% 25.16%
We make the following observations from the transfer-learning results in table 2. 1) robustness
transfers: when the source model used for transfer learning is robust, the target model is also robust
(although less so than the source), 2) robustness transfers between models that are more similar: If
the source and target models are trained on datasets with similar distributions, robustness transfers
better, and 3) validation accuracy drops if we transfer from robust models in comparison to naturally
trained source models: if the source model is naturally trained, the natural validation accuracy is
better, although the target model is then vulnerable to adversarial perturbations.
4.2 End-to-end training without forgetting
As discussed in section 4.1, transfer learning can preserve robustness of the source model. However,
it comes at the cost of decreased validation accuracy on natural examples. The trade-off between
generalization and robustness is the subject of recent research [Tsipras et al., 2018, Zhang et al., 2019,
Shafahi et al., 2019b]. In this section, we intend to decrease the performance gap (on natural images)
between target models that are trained using natural and robust feature extractors. To do so, we need
to fine tune the feature extractor parameters θ. Ideally, we should learn to perform well on the target
dataset without catastrophically forgetting the robustness of the source model. To achieve this, we
utilize lifelong learning methods.
Learning without Forgetting (LwF) [Li and Hoiem, 2018] is a method for overcoming catastrophic
forgetting. The method is based on distillation. In this framework, we train the target model with a
loss that includes a distillation term from the previous model (Eq. 3).
min
w,θ
l(z(x, θ), y, w) + λd · d(z(x, θ), z0(x, θ∗r)) (3)
where λd is the feature representation similarity penalty, and d is some distance metric between
the robust model’s feature representations z0(x, θ∗r) and the current model’s feature representations
z(x, θ). Unlike the original LwF paper that used a distilled loss from Hinton et al. [2015], we
simply choose d to be the `2-norm. Our loss is designed to make the feature representations of
the source and target network similar, thus preserving the robust feature representations (Fig. 3).
Ideally, z(x, θ) ≈ z(x, θ∗r). To speed up training, given robust feature extractor parameters θ∗r , we
store z0(x, θ∗r) for the images of the target task and load this from memory (i.e. offline) instead of
performing a forward pass through the robust source network online. Therefore, in the experiments
related to LwF, we do not train with data augmentation because we have not pre-computed z(xa, θ∗r),
where xa is the augmented image. Empirically we verified that d(z(x, θ∗r), z(xa, θ
∗
r)) was not
negligible5.
4The robust CIFAR-100 classifier has 59.87% validation accuracy and 22.76% accuracy on PGD-20 adver-
sarial examples. The average validation accuracy of the two half-CIFAR-100 classifiers on validation examples
is 64.96%+58.48%
2
= 61.72% while the average robustness is 25.16%+15.86%
2
= 20.51%.
5The analysis is in the supplementary.
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Figure 3: Our LwF loss has a term that enforces the similarity of feature representations (i.e.
penultimate layer activations) between the source model and the fine-tuned model.
To improve performance, we follow a warm-start scheme and only train the fully connected parameters
w while keeping the feature extractor parameters θ constant early in training. We then cut the learning
rate and continue fine tuning both θ andw. In our experiments, we use a learning rate of 0.001, and the
warm-start makes up half of the total training iterations. Starting from the pre-trained source model,
we train for a total of 20,000 iterations with batch-size 128. The results of our LwF experiments
with an adversarially trained CIFAR-100 model as source and CIFAR-10 as target are summarized in
table 3.
As can be seen, having a LwF-type regularizer helps in maintaining robustness and also results in a
considerable increase in validation accuracy. The trade-off between robustness and generalization can
be controlled by the choice of λd. It seems that for some choices of λd such as 0.1, robustness also
increases. However, in hindsight, the increase in accuracy on PGD-20 adversarial examples is not
solely due to improvement in robustness. It is due to the fact that the validation accuracy has increased
and we have a better classifier overall. For easier comparisons, we have provided the transfer results
without LwF at the bottom of table 3. Note that using LwF, we can keep the robustness of the source
model and also achieve clean validation accuracy comparable to a model that uses naturally trained
feature extractors. In the supplementary, we show that similar conclusions can be drawn for the split
CIFAR-100 task.
Table 3: Distilling robust features using learning without forgetting. For reference, the bottom of the
table shows results from transfer learning with a frozen feature extractor. The ‘+’ sign refers to using
augmentation.
Source→ Target Dataset Source Model λd val. PGD-20
CIFAR-100+→ CIFAR-10 robust
1e-7 89.07% 0.61%
0.001 86.15% 4.70%
0.0025 81.90% 15.42%
0.005 79.35% 17.61%
0.01 77.73% 17.55%
0.1 73.39% 18.62%
CIFAR-100+→ CIFAR-10+ natural NA 83.05% 0.00%robust NA 72.05% 17.70%
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5 Transfer Learning with ImageNet models
Transfer learning using models trained on ImageNet [Russakovsky et al., 2015] as the source is a
common practice in industry because ImageNet feature extractors are powerful and expressive. In
this section we evaluate how well robustness transfers from these models.
5.1 Transfer learning 101 using ImageNet
Starting from both a natural and robust ImageNet model, we perform the same set of experiments we
did in section 4.1. Robust ImageNet models do not withstand untargeted `∞ attacks with  as large as
for simpler datasets like CIFAR. Following the method Shafahi et al. [2019a], we “free train” a robust
ResNet-50 on ImageNet using replay hyper-parameter m = 4. This hardened ImageNet classifier
withstands attacks bounded by  = 5. Our robust ResNet-50 achieves 59.05% top-1 accuracy on clean
ImageNet validation examples and roughly 27% accuracy against PGD-20 `∞  = 5 attacks. We
experiment with using this robust model as a source, and also a naturally trained ResNet-50 having
clean validation accuracy of 76.04% but a robust accuracy of only 0.02% against  = 5 PGD-20
attacks.
Using the ImageNet source models, we train CIFAR classifiers by retraining the last layer on natural
CIFAR examples. We up-sample the 32×32-dimensional CIFAR images to 224×224 before feeding
them into the ResNet-50 source models that are trained on ImageNet. For evaluation purposes,
we also train robust ResNet-50 models from scratch using [Shafahi et al., 2019a] for the CIFAR
models. To ensure that the transfer learning models and the end-to-end trained robust models have
the same capacity and dimensionality, we first upsample the CIFAR images before feeding them to
the ResNet-50 model. To distinguish between the common case of training ResNet models on CIFAR
images that are 32× 32-dimensional, we call our models that are trained on the upsampled CIFAR
datasets the upsample-first ResNets or “u-ResNets”.
Table 4: Transfer learning 101 from ImageNet.
Architecture and Source Dataset Target Dataset Source Model val. PGD-20
ResNet-50 ImageNet CIFAR-10+
natural 90.49% 0.01%
robust ( = 5) 88.33% 22.66%
CIFAR-100+
natural 72.84% 0.05%
robust ( = 5) 68.88% 15.21%
Robust u-ResNet-50 ( = 5) for CIFAR-10+ 82.00% 53.11%
Robust u-ResNet-50 ( = 5) for CIFAR-100+ 59.90% 29.54%
Table 4 illustrates that using a robust ImageNet model as a source results in high validation accuracy
for the transferred CIFAR target models. Also, given that the ImageNet classifier by itself is 27%
robust, the CIFAR-10 model maintains the majority of that 27% robustness. When we compare the
end-to-end hardened classifiers (robust u-ResNets) with the transferred classifier, we can see that
while the robustness is less for the transferred case, transferred models result in considerably better
performance on clean validation examples.
5.2 Training deeper networks on top of robust feature extractors
The basic transfer learning setting of section 5.1 only re-trains one layer for the new task. In
section 5.1, when we transferred from the robust ImageNet to CIFAR-100, the natural training
accuracy was 88.84%. Given the small number of trainable parameters left for the network (≈
2048× 100) and the fixed feature extractor, the network was not capable of completely fitting the
training data. This means that there is potential to improve natural accuracy by learning more complex
non-linear features and increasing the number of trainable parameters.
To increase representation capacity and the number of trainable parameters, instead of training a
1-layer network on top of the feature extractor, we train a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) network on
top of the robust feature extractor. To keep things simple and prevent bottle-necking, every hidden
layer we add has 2048 neurons. We plot the training and validation accuracies on the natural examples
and the robustness (i.e. PGD-20 validation accuracy) in Fig. 4 for various numbers of hidden layers.
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Figure 4: Training an MLP for CIFAR-100
on top of the robust feature extractors from
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As can be seen, adding one layer is enough to achieve 100% training accuracy. However, doing so
does not result in an increase in validation accuracy. To the contrary, adding more layers can result in
a slight drop in validation accuracy due to overfitting. As illustrated, we can improve generalization
using simple but effective methods such as dropout [Srivastava et al., 2014] (with probability 0.25)
and batch-normalization [Ioffe and Szegedy, 2015].
However, the most interesting behavior we observe in this experiment is that, as we increase the
number of hidden layers, the robustness to PGD-20 attacks improves. Note, this seems to happen
even when we transfer from a naturally trained ImageNet model, which leads us to suspect that this
behavior may be an artifact of vanishing gradients as the softmax loss saturates when the data is
fit perfectly [Athalye et al., 2018]. Therefore, for this case we change our robustness measure and
use the CW attack [Carlini and Wagner, 2017] which will encounter less numerical issues because
its loss function does not have a softmax component and does not saturate. Attacking the model
from the natural source with CW-20 completely breaks the model and achieves 0% robustness. Most
interestingly, attacking the model transferred from a robust source using the CW objective maintains
robustness even when the number of hidden layers increases.
6 Analysis: What does it mean to have a robust feature extractor?
Our experiments suggest that the robustness of neural networks arises in large part from the presence
of robust feature extractors. We have used this observation to transfer both robustness and accuracy
between domains using transfer-learning and lifelong learning. However, we have not yet fully delved
into what it means to have a robust feature extractor. Through visualizations, Tsipras et al. [2018]
studied how adversarial training causes the image gradients of neural networks to exhibit meaningful
generative behavior. In other words, adversarial perturbations on hardened networks “look like” the
class into which the image is perturbed. Given that optimization-based attacks build adversarial
examples using the image gradient, we also visualize the image gradients of our transferred models
to see if they exhibit the same generative behavior as adversarially trained nets.
Fig. 5 plots the gradient of the loss w.r.t. the input image for models obtained by re-training only
the last layer, and also for the case where we train MLPs on top of a robust feature extractor. The
gradients for the transfer-learned models with a robust source are interpretable and “look like” the
adversarial object class, while the gradients of models transferred from a natural source do not. This
interpretatbility comes despite the fact that the source model was hardened against attacks on one
dataset, and the transferred model is being tested on object classes from another. Also, we see that
adding more layers on top of the feature extractor, which often leads to over-fitting, does not make
gradients less interpretable. This latter observation is consistent with our observation that added
layers preserve robustness(Fig. 4).
These observations, together with the success of robust transfer learning, leads us to speculate that a
robust model’s feature extractors act as a “filter” that ignores irrelevant parts of the image.
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Figure 5: Gradients of the loss w.r.t to input images
for the CIFAR-100 transfer learning experiments of
sections 5.1 & 5.2. The top row contains sample
CIFAR-100 images. Other rows contain image gra-
dients of the model loss. The second row is for a
model transferred from a naturally trained ImageNet
source. Rows 3-5 are for models transferred from a
robust ImageNet source. These rows correspond to
an MLP with 0 (row 3), 1 (row 4), and 2 (row 5) hid-
den layers on top of the robust feature extractor. The
gradients in the last three rows all show interpretable
generative behavior.
7 Conclusion
We identified the feature extractors of adversarially trained models as a source of robustness, and
use this observation to transfer robustness to new problems domains without adversarial training.
While transferring from a natural model can achieve higher validation accuracy in comparison to
transferring from a robust model, we can close the gap and maintain the initial transferred robustness
by borrowing ideas from the lifelong learning literature. The success of this methods suggests that a
robust feature extractor is effectively a filter that sifts out relevant components of an image that are
needed to assign class labels.
We hope that the insights from this study enable practitioners to build robust models in situations with
limited labeled training data, or when the cost and complexity of adversarial training from scratch is
untenable.
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A The distance between feature representations of natural images and
augmented images
To speed up the LwF experiments, we did not use data augmentation during training. Instead of
computing the robust feature representations on the fly, before starting training on the new target
task, we passed the entire training data of the target task through the robust network and stored
the feature representation vector. If we were doing data augmentation, we would have to pass the
entire augmented training data through the network, which would be slow and memory intensive.
Alternatively, we could use the robust feature representation of the non-augmented images instead.
The latter would have been feasible if the distance between the robust feature representations of the
non-augmented and augmented images were very small. However, as shown in fig 6, this quantity is
not often negligible.
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(a) Histogram of ‖z(x, θ∗r ), z(xa, θ∗r )‖2 for CIFAR-10
dataset, given θ∗r for CIFAR-100 dataset. The mean for
both training and test examples is ' 5.53
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(b) Histogram of ‖z(x, θ∗r ), z(xa, θ∗r )‖2 for CIFAR-
100 dataset, given θ∗r for CIFAR-100 dataset. The mean
for both training and test examples is ' 5.57
Figure 6: Figures 6a and 6b both show that the values of ‖z(x, θ∗r), z(xa, θ∗r)‖2 are high most of the
time, consequently, LwF is better done without data augmentation.
B LwF-based robust transfer learning for similar source and target datasets
In table 5 we conduct LwF experiments on the split CIFAR-100 task which is more suited for transfer
learning due to the similarities between the source and target datasets. In these situations, the LwF
regularizer on the feature representations still works and can improve generalization without becoming
vulnerable to adversarial examples. If we take the average performance of the robust classifiers on
the split tasks (average of robust half CIFAR-100 and the LwF setting model for λd = 0.01) we get
(63.32 + 64.96)/2 = 64.14% average validation accuracy and 20.42% average robustness which is
comparable with the case that we had adversarially trained the entire CIFAR-100 dataset (table 1).
Table 5: Distilling robust features using LwF for the split CIFAR-100 task. For reference, we have
included the results from transfer learning by freezing the features at the bottom of the table.
Source→ Target Dataset Source Model λd val. PGD-20
CIFAR-100+ (1/2)→ CIFAR-100 (other 1/2) robust
0.001 73.30% 1.92%
0.005 66.96% 10.52%
0.01 63.32% 15.68%
0.1 55.14% 17.26%
CIFAR-100+ (1/2)→ CIFAR-100+ (other 1/2) natural NA 71.44% 0.00%robust NA 58.48% 15.86%
11
